Notes from the Panopticon

Kyoto – hot air? A review of Bjorn Lomborg’s book: Cool It

"Political correctness is the natural continuum from the party line. What we are seeing once again is a self-appointed group of vigilantes imposing their views on others. It is a heritage of communism, but they don't seem to see this." ~ Doris Lessing (1919- )

My subject this week is the Kyoto Protocol on reducing greenhouse gas emissions and specifically Bjorn Lomborg's new book on climate change Cool It. According to Lomborg there are two major problems with Kyoto:

• It is expensive to implement.
• The beneficial impact on the physical consequences of climate change will be limited.

So why is the world so enthusiastic about it?

• Cutting CO2 and our carbon footprints are eye-catching policies which are easy to sell.
• Because the predicted effects of climate change are relatively long term (best predictions forecast it will take more than 90 years for sea levels to rise by 1 foot or 30 cm), the implementation of carbon reduction is not urgent (the world has already coped with the same rise in sea level which occurred over the last 150 years)
• Politicians are taking advantage of this lack of urgency. It is easy to advocate policies which require that little money is spent during their own terms in office, but laying the burden at the feet of their successors.

At the same time, while talking up the importance of climate change and giving the impression that it is being treated as top priority, pressure is taken off spending on other aid priorities.

Global warming deniers

I have been a fan of Bjorn Lomborg ever since I came across his book The Sceptical Environmentalist. I eagerly awaited his new book on global warming and it has certainly not disappointed.

There is a lot of misinformation about. It is dangerous to rely on newspaper reports and I lack the scientific knowledge to make my own judgements. I am, however, suspicious of a scientific establishment that attacks on its opponents for being global-warming-deniers and "flat-earthers" (Al Gore's defence of his exaggerated presentation of his case). Global warming, after all, remains a theory, with much supporting – but circumstantial – evidence.

Political verdict

So why do I trust Lomborg? Firstly, because his first book has weathered the vicious attacks from arch-environmentalists. The Danish Committee on Scientific Dishonesty (DCSD) used information published by Lomborg's critics in the Scientific American magazine to brand his work as "objectively scientifically dishonest". But after a year's study, the Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation found the DCSC report to be "dissatisfactory", "deserving [of] criticism" and "emotional." It also found the DCSC's ruling to be "completely void of argumentation" and "an almost totally political verdict." 

Right wing American propaganda

Lomborg, a university professor, first became sceptical of environmental claims when he "read a Wired magazine interview with economist Julian Simon claiming that the environment, contrary to common understanding, was getting better, not worse". His instinctive reaction was that this was "right wing, American propaganda".  It seemed an ideal class project and he set out, with his top students, to prove Simon wrong. Much to everyone's surprise, they found that most (although not all) of what Simon had said was right.

Lomborg's approach is to re-examine the very same research used by the environmentalist lobby to make their case. He and his students found that data is often used selectively to support a preconceived view, rather than allowing the data to direct them to a conclusion.

Case for carbon reduction

He has used the same approach in preparing his new book about global warming. The book is short and to the point and it exposes the dishonesty of much of the case for carbon reduction as a means for tackling global warming.

My friends scoff at my scepticism at what I see as "environmental correctness" (A subset of political correctness, which I despise). So I was glad to receive my copy of Cool It soon after the High Court in London ruled that "Al Gore's apocalyptic vision" presented in his film An Inconvenient Truth was "politically partisan" and "not an impartial analysis of the science of climate change." This made it even easier for me to accept and support a judgement made by someone whose objectivity I trust.

The argument in a nutshell

Lomborg's argument in a nutshell is:

• It is likely that human activities are contributing to a significant warming of the atmosphere.
• The consequences of the degree of warming predicted by the various scientific models are nothing like as dire as the environmentalist lobby would have us believe; nor is it not imminent
• Some of the worst consequences in human suffering and financial cost have more to do with social change than with the effect of weather (notably, people have moved into zones affected by flooding and extreme weather so the same amount of extreme weather has exacerbated the consequences)
• Global warming has positive as well as negative effects, but only the negative impacts are mentioned in newspaper reports and by environmental lobbyists (e.g. the number of additional casualties caused by hotter summers is far outweighed by the extra people who survive because of warmer winters)
• The money that needs to be spent on CO2 reduction to deflect global warming is huge and will have only a small benefit. (e.g. the consensus of studies show that, for Kyoto to be fully implemented, high fuel taxes would have to be introduced; the benefit achieved would be that a 1 foot rise in sea level, predicted by the end of the century, would be postponed by just 4 years).
• The enormous cost of Kyoto will deflect resources from other programmes which would have a much larger impact and more immediate effect on human welfare (e.g. malaria protection, HIV/AIDs treatment, flood prevention, and R&D on alternative energy).
• Money spent on these alternative programmes would alleviate suffering and release people to become productive individuals creating resources to tackle the effects of Global warming as better strategies and technologies are developed.

Polar Bears

So let's put a bit of flesh on the bones. Lomborg starts as he means to go on by exploding the polar bear argument (the claim that global warming will melt the Arctic ice and wipe out a beautiful and unique species by destroying its habitat). This is a great media story with inspiring illustrations of polar bears drifting helplessly on ice floes or swimming to exhaustion. The reality, according to studies by the Polar Bear Specialist Group of the World Conservation Union, is that the polar bear population has risen from 5000 in the 1960s to 25,000 today. The reason for this increase is hunting control. And only two groups of bears are declining in numbers, both of which live in an area that is becoming colder. Meanwhile, two other groups which are increasing in numbers live in an area that is becoming warmer.

The most studied group of polar bears lives on the coast of Hudson Bay. Its numbers have grown from 500 in 1981 to 1200 in 1987. Since then, numbers have fallen to 940 in 2004, but this is still almost double the number in 1981. The headlines also fail to mention that, of the 300-500 bears that are shot every year, an average of 49 are shot in the area of the Hudson Bay colony. So hunting – not global warming – has the most significant effect on bear numbers.

Scientifically dishonest

This example shows how the environmental lobby, aided by the media, short changes the public in the presentation of its case. Tim Higham, spokesman for the United Nations Environment Programme, has been disarmingly frank about this. The official summary of the Programme's 2001 report was changed from a milder draft version ("There has been a discernable human influence on global climate") to a stronger statement ("most observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations.") Higham explained this change as follows: "there was no new science, but the scientists wanted to present a clear and strong message to policy makers."

It gets worse. One unnamed scientist is reported to have written to a "fellow believer," proposing that an earlier period of climate warming (known as "the medieval warm period") should be "covered up" from the history in order to avoid undermining the climate-change argument.

There are also numerous examples of how political rhetoric is at odds with reality. For example, in 1997, the British government promised to cut emissions by 10% by 2010; instead emission have increased by 3%.

Better alternatives

Having exposed the dishonesty that characterises the case for tackling CO2 emissions through the Kyoto approach, Lomborg argues that there are more effective alternatives:

• Instead of imposing a massive financial burden in both the rich and poor worlds through carbon taxes, cheaper measures such as malaria control would improve the health and welfare of many poor people. They would better placed to implement more cost-effective solutions to the problems of global warming. History has shown that richer countries have a much better track record for tackling environmental damage than poorer ones.
• Discouraging development in vulnerable areas subject to flooding and extreme weather hazards would cut the human and financial costs far more than carbon emission reduction.

One review of Cool It claims that Lomborg is doing the equivalent of describing the tipping point in an experiment where fruit flies are sealed into an airtight container with food but limited air – they breed successfully until the air runs out and they start to die. This critic has been sucked in by the hype. The current predictions by the same scientists that are quoted by the ecology lobby are not dire; the time we have to deal with the problem is relatively long.

We don't need eye-catching but inefficient policies that allow today's politicians to take the glory for their vision and foresight, but leave paying the bill to the next generation. Instead we need more carefully considered strategies that avoid the inappropriate use of resources and we can afford the time to improve our capacity to deal with the problem. In short: more haste less speed.

Picture credits

http://motls.blogspot.com/

generation-z.blogspot.com/2007_04_01_archive.html

www.whackynation.com/?cat=3

A really simple explanation of Sunni/Shia tension and the Middle East crisis – Part 4 Theological differences

Heresy is what the minority believe; it is the name given by the powerful to the doctrines of the weak. ~ Robert Green Ingersoll (1833 –1899)

Why do the Sunni and the Shia hate each other? And why has this hatred arisen today when, for many of the centuries since the schism, they rubbed along quite comfortably? It is just another example of the depressingly frequent tactic used by community leaders, to exploit differences between peoples for political advantage. They exaggerate these differences; foster a climate of mutual distrust; and before long, people set about abusing and killing each other.

The original split – election or dynasty

The split between Sunni and Shia goes back to the death of the Prophet Muhammed in 632 CE. It was about the succession. Some Muslims were democratic in their approach and thought the leader of Islam should be elected from among the learned and devout. They chose Abu Bakr, a close friend and companion of the Prophet, who became first Caliph, secular leader of the Islamic nation. His followers claimed the title of "Sunni," or followers of the tradition of the Prophet.

Other Muslims believed in a hereditary solution and chose to follow Ali, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law. They became known as Shia, or party of Ali, or people of the Prophet's household. Their leaders were known as Imams and they followed a line of succession appointed by Muhammed. This dynastic approach has some similarities with the Christian ideas of the divine right of kings and the apostolic succession in the Catholic and Anglican churches, and it continues to characterise Shia practice today. It is no longer dynastic but it does confer a sort-of infallibility on its leaders.

The schism is therefore between the Sunni belief that Islam confers no hereditary privilege or sainthood, and the Shia belief that its leaders are infallible, without sin, appointed by God.

Political rather than spiritual differences

From the beginning, the schism had a political rather than religious nature. The two sides supported their claims to legitimacy with selective readings of both the Koran and the Prophet's actions and sayings towards the end of his life. Ali, the Prophet's cousin, acknowledged his failure to win popular acclaim by accepting Abu Bakr's caliphate a few months after the Prophet's death. He later became the fourth Caliph (following the murder of the third Caliph by dissidents). The Prophet's wife opposed Ali's appointment as Caliph but she was defeated in battle. And although she was later reconciled with Ali, she had succeeded in establishing an opposition.

Ali was assassinated in 661 CE. His son Hussein led a doomed rebellion against the new Caliph and was killed on the battlefield at Karbala in 680 CE. It was his martyrdom which consolidated the separation of the Shia, and it is commemorated in a Shia festival and pilgrimage to Karbala (known as the Ashura). The celebration of the Ashura is a major difference in the rites followed by the two sects, and is a focus for the persecution of Shia by Sunni governments at times when the two sects are at odds with each other. And from time to time, it has provoked the same level of hostility and distrust as the Orange marches in Northern Ireland.

The dominance of the Sunni

In the past, the Shia had limited political success, in sharp contrast to the Sunni whose leaders spawned a succession of dynasties culminating in the Ottoman and Mughal empires. From the early days, the Sunni Caliphs viewed the Shia with suspicion and had to put down several revolts. The Shia claim to a higher truth through connection with the family of the Prophet was a threat to the Sunni; the best way to counter it was to brand Shia theology as heresy. So Sunni political success was accompanied by the development of schools of Islamic law and custom which grew up within a separate religious hierarchy.

Shia Imams and Ayatollahs

After Hussein's death at Karbala, the Shia leaders styled themselves as Imams. In the late 9th century, it was believed that the twelfth Imam had disappeared but not died. Some Shia sects still await his return (a Second Coming) and the idea remains a potent focus for Shia identity.

Eventually, the Shia changed to the Sunni system of using an Ulema (council) to select their supreme leader. The Ulema is made up of senior clerics with a high level of religious education. There is a sort-of parallel here with representative democracy in the West, where power is notionally vested in the people, but in practice it resides in elected representatives who operate independently in the name of the electorate. Membership of the Ulema is earned by religious knowledge and wisdom (rather than by election) but authority is exercised in the name of the Ummah, the community of Muslims. The Shia Ulema appoints a leader, known as an Ayatollah (Sign of Allah), a man who has great religious authority.

With the establishment of the Islamic republic in Iran, the Ulema became even more important among the Shia because it is now at the centre of Iranian government, the ultimate fusion of religion and state. But it is not monolithic. There is a waxing and waning of influence between various religious leaders which depends to a large extent on their ability to attract followers and funds. This is why it is not always clear who calls the shots in Iran.

In some Sunni countries, the Ulema exercise authority by acting as council to the King. And in both Sunni and Shia communities, the councils act as arbiters of Islamic (Sharia) law, in some countries, they also act as judges. This is why Muslims in Western countries find it easy to propose the notion that Sharia law could run parallel with civil law.

Madrasahs

Religious education is at the core of both spiritual leadership and ordinary life for Sunni and Shia. Madrasahs, the religious schools for ordinary Muslims, are growing in importance teaching the Koran to young children. Some madrasahs, however, have been established by fundamentalist groups to recruit and indoctrinate young people in an extreme interpretation of Islam. The first political success of this movement was achieved by Sunni madrasahs which fostered the Taliban.

Madrasahs are of particular importance in Pakistan where they fill a gap left by inadequate government funding. It is not known what proportion of these schools are in the hands of extremists.

Belief and practice

Distinctions between Sunni and Shia in terms of belief are few. They both adhere to the Five Pillars of Islam (the creed, prayer, charity, fasting and pilgrimage). The most visible difference is the Shia adherence to the Ashura. Other differences are concerned mainly with ritual. For example, Sunni pray five times a day while Shia (amalgamating some of the prayer times) pray three times a day. The two sects also use the prayer mat differently.

However, even these differences are fluid. Ayatollah Khomeini, a Shia fundamentalist, has discouraged the celebration of the Ashura in Iran and he surprised the Shia of Pakistan by his disdain for their traditions.

Current divisions and the impact of Ayatollah Khomeini

After the early disputes, Sunni belief and practice consolidated its dominance. The separate Shia hierarchy no longer posed a threat and the two sects rubbed along for many centuries, with little to distinguish their understanding of Islam.

Khomeini, in bringing fundamentalism back into Shia belief and practice, reopened the divide. He abandoned the outward differences by going back to the Koran, which should have made common cause with the fundamentalist practice of the Sunni. Instead, the racial and political differences between the two sects were exposed.

The Iranians are Persians, not Arabs, and their leadership of the Shia world is resented. So Arab Sunnis, however fundamentalist their ideas, would rather side with a dissolute Saudi royal family than with an Iranian Ayatollah, however pious he might be. Khomeini's establishment of an Islamic State was a cause for jealousy, not admiration.

Meanwhile the Shia of Iraq are, to a large extent, descended from Persians who moved to Iraq and adopted the Arabic language and identity in the 16th century. With renewed tension between Sunni and Shia, they are seen as the lackeys of Iran.

So Sunni and Shia rivalry is muddled up with Arab/non-Arab Muslim tension.

The threat to Sunni dominance

Politically, the dominance of the Sunni arose from their success in conquest during the early centuries of Islam. They were seen as the group which carried Islam into the world. The tables are now being turned.

The Shia have demonstrated an ability to humble Israel, a feat which eluded the Sunni. It was the Shia group Hezbollah, fighting from Lebanon with Iranian aid, which achieved this breakthrough. This too has generated jealousy amongst the Sunni and aggravated tension between the two sects. Sunni extremists are inspired to regain their status as champions of Islam by using their fashionable weapon: the suicide bomb.

What we are seeing in the Middle East is nothing new. We only have to think back to the torture and bloodshed which characterised the split between Catholics and the protestants in the 16th and 17th centuries. And the many other conflicts waged in the name of religious or racial or ideological differences.

www.parsarts.com/author/nmilaninia/

A really simple explanation of Sunni/Shia tension and the Middle East crisis – Part 3 The Oil

"War continues in Iraq. They're calling it Operation Iraqi Freedom. They were going to call it Operation Iraqi Liberation until they realized that spells 'OIL' "

Jay Leno (1950- )

With a handle on the demographics of Muslims in the Middle East, an understanding of the economy is the next place to go. It does not take much inspiration to start with oil.

There has been some controversy recently about whether the official figures on oil are honest and whether they have been calculated correctly. Some experts think there is something fishy about them. It's not easy to judge whether they are right or not, but a table of figures produced by Colin Campbell shows data which suggests some overstatement. Campbell is an oil expert who propagates the theory that the peak of oil production is either close or has passed, so we will soon face a shortage. His table shows that, when OPEC linked production quotas to declared reserves, some of its members mysteriously reported large increases in their reserves. Here are his figures:

Peak Oil (the theory that oil production has peaked) is a good example of a controversy where various ideas and figures are offered by opponents to support opposing points of view. A group of motivated consultants (who have worked in the oil industry but are now on its fringes) is pitted against another group representing the oil industry establishment. I am not an expert and have absolutely nothing to contribute to this debate. However, I am of the opinion (I emphasise the word opinion) that doom theories are very common and are rarely borne out by events. So, on balance, I don't believe (I emphasise the world believe) that the theory will prove correct.

This does not mean that Campbell's table, and his conclusion that certain countries are overegging the pudding, should be dismissed out of hand. The figures do look fishy and we must proceed with caution.

The procedure I follow in such circumstances is that I go with the official figures. There is nothing else that can seriously argue with them (though the table provides some clues about the magnitude of any errors), but I sound a note of caution about any conclusions drawn.

So let's see what we can find. A Google search yields an embarrassment of riches. Lots of sites offer information. The most comprehensive is provided by the Energy Information Administration (a US Government body which helpfully compares the results from three separate sources). Most of the figures are similar, so you can be reasonably sure that the people who look at these things are all singing from the same hymn sheet. Luckily, Infoplease seems to use the same base source and provides a much more user-friendly table which I have decided to go with.

And from this I have drawn up Chart 1, which shows immediately why the Middle East attracts so much attention. Many people I talk to are – obviously – aware that the Middle East is important for oil, but they are staggered by how overwhelmingly important it is. I certainly was.

Based on official figures, the Middle East is the repository of 56% of the world's oil (60% if we add North Africa). Even if we assume that Colin Campbell's estimates fully reflect the degree of overstatement and adjust the figures accordingly, the area still controls 48% of the world's oil reserves.

So the importance of the region is awesome and we can see why the US feels compelled to maintain a powerful political presence in the area.

Chart 1

Chart 2 shows how oil reserves are distributed throughout the Middle East:

• Saudi Arabia stands out as the largest repository, with twice as much oil as any other country.
• Kuwait and the UAE have a little less between them.
• Iran and Iraq are the next largest oil-producing countries and it is easy to understand why Saddam Hussein thought it worthwhile to try to capture the oil wealth of his neighbour Kuwait – and also why the US, with very willing allies, did not think twice about coming to Kuwait's aid.
• Afghanistan has no oil and geographically is distant from the real action. It is not surprising that the US was only a half-hearted about the invasion – Iraq was a much better prize.

Chart 2

Chart 3 is redrawn to exclude Campbell's suspect oil reserves. We can see how the picture changes in total magnitude but hardly changes at all in the relative importance of the countries.

Chart 3

So what conclusions can we draw? The reserves fall into three groups:

• The largest reserves are in Saudi Arabia, held by an administration that is generally friendly to the West and reliant for military support on the US. However, it has a restive population which it controls by repression. This restive group is well-funded and supports terrorist operations throughout the world (the Al Qaeda network). The administration's freedom to act is circumscribed by its deal with the fundamentalist Sunni Wahhabi sect (by definition an enemy of the West and its values) to which it has ceded to it a large measure of power. The country is also seen by many Muslims as the champion of the Sunni world (which includes 90% of Muslims, about a billion people). Saudi's rulers have to bend to the mood of this constituency which is tending to become more fearful, more fundamentalist and more anti-Western. So the largest oil reserves are under the control of an administration which looks distinctly vulnerable.
• Almost as large are the reserves of Kuwait and the UEA, countries with small populations which are entirely reliant for their defence on outside allies. The invasion of Kuwait showed that there is a willingness to accept the Americans and it is difficult to imagine that any alternative strategy is open to the ruling houses in these countries. It is also difficult to imagine that the US would let these states fall into the hands of hostile groups, although hostile fundamentalist organisations are no doubt working to exploit vulnerability in these countries.
• The third batch of reserves, again about the same size as those of Saudi Arabia, is shared between Iran and Iraq. And this is where Sunni and Shia come face to face. In Iraq, the Shia majority was kept down by a Sunni minority led by Saddam Hussein, who (in 1980) led the country into an eight-year war with the Shia in Iran to head off any possibility that they might foment internal resistance. The war cost a million lives and was characterised by waves of Iranian suicide infantry clearing minefields by blowing themselves up, and by gas attacks by the Iraqis. You can imagine the ill-feeling between Sunni and Shia that this left behind, and both sides took the opportunity offered by the invasion of Iraq to stir up as much hatred and mistrust as they could. There are daily atrocities. Groups of people and buildings are targeted, as well as the abduction, torture and murder of individuals.

The coalition walked calmly into this hornet's nest and was surprised when it was stung. It's arrival has hardened attitudes throughout the region.

This is not an exceptional conclusion. But what I have done is to assemble evidence which means that we can now defend this point of view, while it is harder for opponents to challenge it. It also makes the argument between the pro- and anti- war groups much clearer. Instead of all the nonsense about weapons of mass destruction, regime change, the freeing of a subjugated population, and the introduction of democracy, we have a question to ask. Do we want to risk half the world's oil falling into the hands of a hostile group of fundamentalists who are openly hostile to the West and its values?

If we ask this question, the issue becomes very clear and, in one sense, easier to argue. On the other hand, questions of morality and international law are thrown into sharp and unflattering focus.

So a big decision was made on our behalf and an enormous risk was taken. It will be a tragedy – for which we shall all have to pay – if it turns out that the risk was taken by a man who was not up to the task and who bodged this difficult and dangerous venture.

Sources:

Peak Oil

Infoplease

EIA

The Sharks and the Jets

The last few weeks have given an insight into the silly, testosterone-fuelled, adolescent nature of our political class. With the smell of an election in the wind, they spent the time braying at each other, calling each other chicken, and striking menacing poses.

Neither side felt particularly confident, so the poses were particularly nauseous and infantile. But they were not unusual. When will politicians grow up and behave in a way that earns respect instead of behaving like gangs of louts?

The press does not help – journalists stand about and egg the idiots on.

And we're supposed to take elections seriously.

A really simple explanation of Sunni/Shia tension and the Middle East crisis – Part 2 The People

Human diversity makes tolerance more than a virtue; it makes it a requirement for survival. ~ René Jules Dubos (1901 – 1982)

I have divided this article into two parts. The first is an analysis of the Sunni/Shia divisions of the Middle East population; the second shows my methods for researching the numbers and marshalling the data. Because there is so much to go through, the first part is longer than normal. I hope you will stick with it. I understand a lot more about the situation in the Middle East than I did when I started my research and I hope that you will too.

I have put material about my methods of research onto a separate page which you can access at the end of this article.

A little background

Islam was founded in the 7th century on the Arabian Peninsula in the heart of the Middle East. Within a hundred years, it had spread north to the borders of what is now Turkey; east to Afghanistan and the borders of what is now Pakistan; and west along the southern shore of the Mediterranean, all the way to the Atlantic and across into Spain (and with the exception of Spain, it has dominated these areas ever since). More recently, it has expanded further to the east and the south.

The split between Sunni and Shia occurred soon after the death of Mohammed and, almost from the start, the Shia were regarded as heretics – even as non-believers – and discriminated against in many periods of Islamic history (I shall return to the differences between the two sects at a later date). Distrust between the two sects has waxed and waned over the centuries, a deep-rooted, historic animosity that is being revived in today's conflict.

An overview of the region

The area covered in this study is focused on the heartland that was established in the 7th and 8th centuries. Map 1 shows the countries examined (Western Sahara and Mauritania are excluded from the study).

The map shows how close the Middle East is to the EU on the west and to Russia on the north, while a batch of former Soviet states with their own Muslim populations are found to the north-east.

Map 1

• In order to focus my analysis, I divided the area into three sub-sections:
• the central Middle East (CME), where most of the oil is found and where the current conflict is centered.
• the outer Middle East (OME), a circle of populous countries with little in the way of oil, which surround the central area.
• North African countries (NA), which have significant oil reserves. This area is important because Algeria is where Islamic terrorism began. It is home to very few Shia Muslims and will therefore not be considered in detail until later articles when I will look at oil.

Map 2 shows the central area of the Middle East (CMO) in more detail.

Map 2

Where Sunni and Shia live

Chart 1 analyses the population of the three sub-sectors and throws up some interesting features. The whole region is home to 635mn Muslims, a little more than half the world's Islamic population (estimated at between 900 mn and 1.4 bn):

• 13% live in North Africa (NA) and are almost entirely Sunni.
• 52% live in the outer Middle East (OME) and are also mostly Sunni, although a significant number of Shia live in Pakistan.
• The other 35% live in the central Middle East (CME) and 44% of them are Shia.

Chart 1

Chart 2 breaks down the huge population of the OME. This is dominated by Pakistan, although Egypt, Turkey and Sudan have populations to rival that of Iran, the largest country in the CME.

Chart 2

I started my research with the idea that the CME was fairly evenly divided between Sunni and Shia. But Chart 3 shows a dramatically different picture. First, Iran and Iraq are the only countries with a significant Shia majority, and together they account for 77% of the population of the area. Second, the Shia are overwhelmingly concentrated in Iran. And as Iraq also has a Shia majority, we can begin to understand what is driving the conflict.

Examining the chart further, we see that Afghanistan and Yemen are the only other large-population countries where the Shia minority is of a significant size. Shia also outnumber Sunni in Bahrain and Lebanon, but these countries have small populations.

Chart 3

So let's recap with another map, helpfully provided on the internet by the US Congressional Research Service.

Map 3

Now we can begin to build a picture which allows us to understand a little more about the various conflicts.

The Shia heartland and the focus of the conflict

The first thing that stands out is that the Middle East is not evenly divided between Sunni and Shia. Since Iran has by far the largest Shia population, you might expect it to have common cause with Iraq, the only other large-population country with a Shia majority. And yet these two countries fought the bitter Iran-Iraq war through the 1980s. Three things divided them:

• the Sunni minority led by Saddam Hussein was in charge in Iraq and, over the years, the Shia population was pushed further and further from power.
• Iranians, unlike Iraqis, are mainly Persians (not Arabs).
• Iraq was run as a secular state, whereas Iran (following the overthrow of the Shah in 1978/9 by the fiercely fundamentalist Ayatollah Khomeini) became an Islamic Republic.

A step back: the rise of Sunni fundamentalism and Al Qaeda

In order to understand the significance of the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini, we need to look at the power structures in the region.

Islam claims a very special place in the lives of its followers. It provides them, not only with a spiritual structure to guide them, but laws by which they should organise their personal, family and community lives. This poses a problem for political rulers and their relations with religious hierarchies. For a long period, and in most of the countries, rulers tried to run secular states alongside an Islamic legal structure. They made links with the West and did not force strict Islamic rules on their populations. Women, for example, were educated and allowed to pursue professional careers in most countries. More than one Islamic country has been led by a woman.

The special place of Saudi Arabia and the House of Saud

Saudi Arabia was the exception. It was the dominant state of the region for two reasons:

• It had the bulk of the oil and was therefore very wealthy.
• It was – literally – the cradle of Islam.

The Saudi royal house (the House of Saud) was the guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. In order to fulfil its spiritual role while allowing its royalty to enjoy the massive wealth from oil resources, a special relationship was established between the House of Saud and the fundamentalist Wahhabi (Sunni) sect. The Wahhabi hierarchy was given control over religious law, while the royal family controlled secular matters, notably economic and diplomatic affairs. Crucially, the House of Saud looked to the West to provide it with resources to secure its political control of the country. And this control is absolute; the House of Saud views its kingdom as a family asset.

Along with other oil-rich countries, Saudi's efforts to improve the quality of life for the mass of its population were limited. And the little it did do was counter-productive. It provided education without opportunity. As a result, a resentful class of poor – and not so poor – second-class citizens emerged, which turned to fundamental Islam for an outlet for their frustration.

It was among this group of disgruntled Sunnis in Saudi Arabia that the seeds of Al Qaeda began to grow. Their anger was against the House of Saud and its Western allies. The rhetoric they used was religious and it attracted followers throughout the region, resentful at the way in which oil revenues lined the pockets of lax Muslim rulers and their infidel Western supporters. Some of these malcontents – notably Osama bin Laden – also had money which they used to fund the dissident movements in the region and beyond.

The Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war

Although Saudi Arabia enforced adherence to Muslim law, there was no integration between religion and state. It was Ayatollah Khomeini and his Iranian Revolution which first established a fiercely-fundamentalist Islamic state. But it was a Shia state and it posed a threat to the Sunnis. While Khomeini did little to disguise his contempt for the laxity of the Saudi royal family, his biggest threat was to Saddam's Hussein's Ba'ath regime in Iraq.

Saddam was Sunni, his rule was distinctly secular, and the persecution of his Shia majority made it easy for Khomeini to attract followers with his fundamentalist call. Saddam recognised the danger. Fearing that the newly-fundamentalist Iran would encourage his Shia majority to rebel against him, he made a peremptory strike before Khomeini had time to consolidate his forces. And so began the eight-year Iran-Iraq war which resulted in the deaths of a million people.

The war ended in stalemate in 1988, despite Iraq's military advantage and use of chemical weapons, and Saddam took his revenge on his Shia population.

Sunni/Shia tensions in Iraq after Saddam

With the overthrow of Saddam, it is not surprising that Iraq's Sunni minority are feeling vulnerable. De-Ba'athification (the elimination of Saddam's political Ba'ath party) has meant that the Shia majority – which suffered discrimination for so long – is now on the cusp of gaining the upper hand. It is also in search of revenge.

It is Shia men who are joining the police and security forces; it is Shia men who are accused of abusing their position against their former tormentors. And this is why Sunni suicide bombers so often attack the queues waiting to join the security services.

The security vacuum created by the invasion of Iraq – and exacerbated by de-Ba'athification and the dismantling of the Iraqi army and police – has created an opportunity for Al Qaeda, the terrorist arm of Sunni fundamentalism. And it is Al Quaeda which is taking advantage of Sunni vulnerability in Iraq to insinuate itself into the vacuum left by the invasion.

The Sunni Shia battle lines

Khomeini hoped that his fundamentalist call would mobilise opponents of the House of Saud to help eliminate Western influence in the region. Instead, he recharged ancient antagonisms between Persians and Arabs and precipitated a contest between fundamentalist Sunni and Shia for the soul of Islam. And once again, Sunni mullahs began to denounce Shia as heretics, as not truly Muslim.

King Faisal, who ruled Saudi Arabia from 1964 to 1975, was a devout man who lived humbly (it was his memory that gave credibility, despite their ostentatious lifestyles, to his three younger brothers who succeeded him). In addition to allowing the royal family to live the high life, Saudi Arabia used its wealth to support Sunni religious projects elsewhere in the region. So Khomeini's attack on the profligacy of the House of Saud was not well received. It caused further tension between Sunni and Shia, and Saudi police attacked Shia pilgrims on the Hajj. In one incident in 1987, 402 people were killed.

Disintegration

With this background, it is not surprising that Iraq is riven with factions. There are moderate Shia and fundamentalist Shia, moderate Sunni and fundamentalist Sunni. And as ever in a power vacuum, strong men and religious leaders within each group jockey for position. The consequence is bitter infighting and a horrific campaign of sectarian violence: kidnapping, torture and murder. There is also friction within the sects and this too can break out into violence.

Another - political – split within Shia ranks is between those who want to use their majority to dominate any new administration and those who prefer a federal solution (by which Shia would have ascendency in some regions, leaving Sunni majorities in other areas to run their own affairs). As a result, Iraqis working with the US occupiers are finding it difficult to mobilise support for a unitary government to include the Sunni minority. The situation has become even more difficult since the bombing of the mosque in Samarra, a major Shia shrine, in February 2006. This blatant attack by Sunnis on an important Shia symbol was inflammatory and the death toll from sectarian violence rose from 500 to 900 deaths per month in the aftermath.

The dilemma of the US

The US in Iraq is caught between a rock and a hard place. The de-Ba'athification policy instituted when the Americans arrived in Baghdad, and the democracy which they are now attempting to establish, mean that the Shia are in the ascendant. The displaced Sunni establishment is resentful and hostile. But any attempt by the US to redress the balance revives Shia memories of the first Gulf War when they were encouraged by the US to rebel against Saddam and then abandoned to the cruelty of his revenge. Above all, it stiffens the resolve of Iran to support its co-religionists and to make bellicose threats.

Effects on the region

The intractable problem inside Iraq is now echoed across the region. Iran, as leader of the Shia, is mobilising wherever it can. It is focusing on Lebanon, which has a small population but a relatively high proportion of Shia and is situated on the western edge of the Middle East adjacent to Israel, with the ability to strike at this arch enemy of all Muslims.

Iran is therefore funding Hezbollah, the Shia militia group, to engage in hostilities with Israel. It is also channelling money through Hezbollah to help Lebanese families handle the aftermath of Israeli attacks. In this way, it is funding a friendly party to establish a political power base in Lebanon.

Above all, it is the success of Hezbollah against Israel that is giving the Shia the upper hand in the region – in stark contrast to repeated Sunni failure. Shia success gives Iran and its allies an advantage which even the most formidable of Shia enemies, the Saudi regime, cannot match.

And finally there is Lebanon's neighbour, Syria, where a secular Shia minority governs a majority Sunni population. Its government's natural allies are Iran and Hezbollah – and with this rather weak link, the Shia have a continuous chain of control across the north of the region.

Polarisation

The governments of the oil-rich Sunni states, especially Saudi Arabia, are walking a tightrope. They rely on the West, especially the US, to provide them with military support and financial infrastructure. This is a dangerous policy in a climate where fundamentalist mullahs are capturing the hearts of a deeply-frustrated younger generation. These young men have limited prospects and little chance to sample the pleasures of the West (which are so ostentatiously enjoyed by the elites in their countries). Through fundamentalist education and inclusion in fanatical groups, they are finding an alternative outlet for their aspirations.

The easiest way for Sunni governments to deflect attention away from their unpopular and dangerous allegiance with "the Devil" – the West – is to emphasise hostility to Iran and to the Shia heresy. At the same time, Shia ascendancy in the north of the region may well encourage Sunni governments to act against their Shia minorities. So there is danger of a growing polarisation between the two sects.

                                      A brief recap

So we now have an outline of the background against which the conflict is taking place. Understanding where the Shia population is concentrated helps to explain why there is tension inside Iraq and why Iran is trying to win the allegiance of its fellow Shia by providing them with military support. It also explains why Al Qaeda finds adherents. As the most active Sunni force, it offers a strong arm to support the Sunni minority in Iraq which is now in such a vulnerable position.

Neither governments nor religious establishments are monolithic. Beneath the surface there is a lot of jostling for position, particularly inside Iran. The extremists are in the minority, but growing fear and sectarian tension leads to polarisation and drives the moderates into the camp of extremists on both sides of the sectarian divide. The US has no natural and unequivocal allies, so is particularly vulnerable to this shifting situation. Its much-vaunted reliance on democracy will backfire as the Middle East turns increasingly to hard-line attitudes. All this and much, much more awaits us as we continue our investigation.

Next week, we shall look at oil.

Sources

CIA World Factbook

MideastWeb Gateway

Congressional Research Service

Notes on research methods

For an explanation of the colour coding see note at the end of the first artcle in this series