Notes from the Panopticon

Learning lessons

Education is the transmission of civilization.~ William James Durant (1885–1981) and Ariel Durant, born Chaya Kaufman (1898 - 1981)

After the murder of Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan dominated the news for a week or so but that has now faded. We were regaled with speculation about the danger to the world posed by an unstable, nuclear-armed, undemocratic state where fundamentalist Muslims find it easy to integrate into society. It was in Pakistan that the Taliban (which took over the government of Afghanistan and provided shelter to Al Qaeda) were originally able to organize and build a foundation. A recent analysis on television suggests that the Taliban are direct descendants of protestors who instigated the mutiny against British imperial rule and Christian missionary zeal in 19^th century India. But Pakistan is also seen as a major bulwark in the "War on Terror" and has been the recipient of $5bn in US aid since the attack on the twin towers.

Endemic corruption 

Now the excitement has died down, Pakistan has dropped out of media consciousness but its problems remain. And one of its greatest problems is education. Like the rest of public life in Pakistan, the education system is subject to endemic corruption. And this should trouble the rest of the world because education in Pakistan is being exploited by fundamentalists in their drive to recruit new followers.

When it was provided with American aid on a massive scale, Pakistan promised to devote some of the money to improving its education system. The World Bank has also allocated a separate $300mn specifically to support schools and colleges – but fearing that the money will disappear into a sink of corruption, it is reluctant to disburse the funds until proper control systems are put in place. These fears are justified. American officials supervising military aid suspect that invoices for supplies are inflated by as much as 30%, enabling millions of dollars to disappear. And in the education system, officials estimate that corruption taps 15% of intended expenditure.

Dangerous structures

Little has been done to improve education in Pakistan. In the Punjab, for example, there are 63,000 state schools, of which:

• 5,000 (8%) have been condemned as dangerous structures.
• 26,000 (41%) have no electricity.
• 16,000 (25%) have no toilets.

Many teachers see their jobs as sinecures and don't turn up to work, while local inspectors distrust the information provided by the ministry of education. Few schools have enough classrooms and some resort to teaching in the open air under trees (possibly safer than sitting in a classroom with cracks in the walls and an unstable roof). Often they have to cope with only one quarter of the desks required. Understandably, parents are reluctant to send their children to these underfunded and under-supervised institutions.

Vacuum filled

Two groups of educators have moved in to fill this vacuum: private schools and religious madrassas. It is the madrassas that have attracted most attention and generated hysteria in the press both inside and outside Pakistan. Some of them are run by fundamentalists, preach Jihad, and groom their students to be revolutionary fighters and suicide bombers

The media in Pakistan and across the world, supported by wild estimates made by Pakistani police, have exaggerated the scale of this problem. A more restrained study by the World Bank and Harvard University has estimated that the true numbers of children being educated in madrassas represents a little less that 1% of children in the 5-19 age group. These figures must be put into context:

• 33% of children are enrolled in state schools.
• a further 12% are enrolled in private schools.
• 87% of children enroll in primary education, but numbers fall sharply at secondary level.
• literacy rates are 63% for men and 36% for women, showing that the standard of education is poor (in comparison, the figures for India are 76% and 54%).

Wealthily endowed madrassas

The development of the private sector is striking. Private schools now educate one third as many children as those educated in the state sector. The population values education and is willing to make sacrifices to give their children the schooling which the state fails to provide. Much has been said about madrassas (wealthily endowed by Saudi money) providing the only chance for the poorest Pakistani families. But private schools are cheap and all but the very poorest can afford them.

So is there nothing to worry about? Indeed no. There are dangers and they are serious ones. The WB/Harvard study showed that, while in most areas of Pakistan madrassas account for less than 1% of school enrolments, in the so-called tribal areas (where Pasto is the main language and there are strong links to Afghanistan) the percentage rises to over 7%. These are the areas the state finds most difficult to control and, if madrassas do have a malign influence, it is here that it would be easiest to foment and develop an anti-democratic movement.

Children brought up to hate Muslims

The survey also estimated that there are about 175,000 students enrolled in madrassas. If we make a guess that 5% of madrassas are run by fundamentalists, this still means that almost 9000 children are being brought up to hate Muslims who do not meet their own "high" standards.

The theory propagated by the extremists is this. The only acceptable law is Sharia law and this should be interpreted strictly (hence the enforcement of headscarves and the like for women … among much worse horrors). It is the duty of good Muslims to create a state which accepts and enforces Sharia. Government leaders who do not concur are the enemy. Those who conspire with the West are the enemy. Muslims who support these governments are the enemy.

In this way, the fundamentalist madrassas create a justification for killing other Muslims. The suicide bombers are given a target and a cause. It has, however, very little to do with the West; the majority of victims are much closer to home. But a flow of almost 9000 young men and women (possibly more – other estimates are higher and my guess of 5% of may be optimistic) is more than enough to recruit suicide bombers and build momentum for the movement.

Dodging and weaving

So let us return to Benazir Bhutto. She and her husband spent the years since she was ousted from power dodging and weaving to avoid convictions for corruption and embezzlement. Indeed, she was convicted of money laundering by a Swiss magistrate, while a British judge found grounds for a prosecution against her and/or her husband for purchasing an estate in the English home counties with the fruits of embezzlement.

Despite this track record, the West was keen to have Bhutto as a friend in Pakistan because of the fear that a nation with its own nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of someone worse. The US has provided huge amounts of cash, some of which has been used to buy delivery systems for these weapons of mass destruction, and has only recently begun to worry about whose finger might be on the button. Bhutto provided some hope of a friend to the West and she certainly looked the part, acting like a civilized politician, speaking excellent English, and sending her son to Oxford.

She had plenty of support in Pakistan (the first attempt on her life killed more than 130 people because her rally attracted so many supporters). But it is almost certain that she, like other political leaders in Pakistan, was a thief. Some of the money she stole, and the money that leaked away into the pockets of bureaucrats and politicians, was supposed to have been spent on education, on the rebuilding of dangerous schools, and on ensuring that teachers turned up to do their jobs.

The public in Pakistan wants education and many people are willing to pay for it. Some of them, however, send children to be taught hatred by cynical clerics who tell them that martyring themselves while killing the opponents of whichever fundamentalist branch of Islam they represent will earn them a place in paradise.

South Pacific and the terrorist threat

"At the heart of racism is the religious assertion that God made a creative mistake when He brought some people into being" ~ Friedrich Otto Hertz 1878-1964

Last week I went to a lively, enjoyable and well-played amateur performance of South Pacific. When Lt. Cable was asked to marry his Polynesian girlfriend, Liat, he replied that he could not. And when my wife quietly asked why not, I whispered the N word in her ear.

Later Lt. Cable launched into what must be one of the shortest songs in the American musical. I had completely forgotten it.

You've got to be taught
To hate and fear,
You've got to be taught
From year to year,
It's got to be drummed
In your dear little ear
You've got to be carefully taught.

You've got to be taught to be afraid
Of people whose eyes are oddly made,
And people whose skin is a diff'rent shade,
You've got to be carefully taught.

You've got to be taught before it's too late,
Before you are six or seven or eight,
To hate all the people your relatives hate,
You've got to be carefully taught!

Let us not forget that the legacy of this attitude lives on in the land which boasts in its founding documents that all men are created equal and have a right to the pursuit of happiness. Rodgers and Hammerstein felt so strongly about the message of this song that they were willing to risk the entire show when faced with opposition (including a law introduced in Georgia outlawing entertainment containing "an underlying philosophy inspired by Moscow.")

Despite the progress made by the Civil Rights Movement, the chances of a black man going to prison are still massively higher than the chances of a white man doing so. According to Bureau of Justice statistics, by the end of 2005 there were 3,145 black male prison inmates per 100,000 blacks in the United States compared to 471 white male inmates per 100,000 whites. And according to the Death Penalty Information Center in Philadelphia, the chances of a black man being executed are 38% higher than for a white man. Clearly, the lesson has been very carefully taught; forty or fifty years of efforts to eradicate this teaching have barely scratched the surface.

Last week I also heard a programme on the BBC World Service about the origins of the Jihad. It included the following extract from a text book for thirteen-year-old boys currently in use in Saudi schools:

There should be total enmity between believers and polytheists. Believers are not allowed to love polytheists or support them, even if they are close to them. Religiously sanctioned love is only allowed towards Muslims. As for the polytheist he should be hated for his unbelief even if he is close to you.

Polytheists include Sufis and Shiites, whom the Wahabis (the dominant clerical group of Saudi Arabia) accuse of idolatry.

It is frightening to think what effect this teaching is having on young Muslims. It is frightening to think what effect it had on previous generations, many of whom are now engaged in "charitable" programmes to fund Muslim schools across the world. It is important to make a distinction between ordinary Muslims and Muslim fundamentalists, but if this is the kind of material that is being offered in general education in an important Muslim state, we should be very worried indeed.

After all the Nazis succeeded in turning much of the German population into a group willing to tolerate mass murder of the disabled, the gypsies, homosexuals, and notoriously, the Jews and others that they considered to be inferior races.

They invoked what they called "Holy Hate"

Now there is war! The Jews forced us into a struggle for life and death ... It has also forced us to give up the "politeness" that in reality is a weakness ... We as a people will survive this war only if we eliminate weakness and "politeness" and respond to the Jews with an equal hatred ... If we do not oppose the Jews with the entire energy of our people, we are lost... Our holy hate will bring us victory and save all of mankind.

Bigotry is everywhere. It is only by recognizing it and rejecting it in our own sphere of influence that we can succeed in fighting it in countries and communities where it is threatening to become mainstream. The teaching of hatred is a danger to the world and must be resisted at all costs.

The Curse of Oil (A really simple explanation of the Middle East Crisis~Part 5)

 

It is said that power corrupts, but actually it's more true that power attracts the corruptible. The sane are usually attracted by other things than power. ~ David Brin quotes (1950- )

 

The curse

I'll begin this article with an analogy. Imagine an enormous family (the whole Middle East region). The old patriarch has a huge fortune which he leaves to only some of his many sons. Each son has a family of his own.

To two of his sons with large families, the patriarch leaves large fortunes (Iran and Iraq). To three of his sons with very small families, he also leaves large fortunes (the Gulf States). To one son who has a smallish family, he leaves almost half of his wealth (Saudi Arabia). A few other sons get smaller bequests (e.g. Libya and Algeria).

To the son with the largest family (Pakistan). he leaves nothing. Other sons with big families are also left out of his will (Egypt and Turkey).

Imagine the ill-feeling in that family.

Now imagine this. The son who has been left the largest bequest has an inner circle in his family which is favoured over the rest. Not only that, but he and his inner circle bully members of the outer circle and irritate others by arbitrarily distributing largess.

Imagine the resentment now. Imagine the bad blood, the intrigue and hatred, the cabals forming and breaking up. And when resentful members of the family try to kick back, they are labelled as "black sheep" and go off to lick their wounds and foment resentment among ill-treated members of other families.

Meanwhile, members of the inner circle are making foreign friends and exchanging their wealth for boy's toys and luxury goods. They do little to hide their extravagant lifestyles. They enlist their foreign friends to help defend themselves from their resentful families and to offer advice about how to keep the more troublesome members of the family in check.

Above all, the rich family members – while paying lip-service to the religious and moral strictures and traditions of their fathers – ignore them completely. So it is easy for the "black sheep" to use what they see as the call of family tradition to mobilise resentful young men amongst the poor and deprived members of the extended family. And from this base, they inflict indiscriminate misery on the rest of the family ("if you're not with us you're against us"). The greatest degree of suffering is born, not by the wealthy who protect themselves, but by the poor and unprotected, while some spite is reserved for the foreign friends of the rich – who take attacks particularly hard because they cannot understand how or why it is their fault.

Now you have an idea of what is happening in the Middle East.

The history – the fall of the Ottoman Empire

Much of the Middle East was under the control of the Ottoman Empire after it was captured by the Turks in the 16th century. During the 19th century, the Ottomans effectively bankrupted their empire and it fell under the financial control of European powers, who were quick to annex what the Turks could no longer defend. Local rulers in the Middle East attempted to modernise and import Western models of government, but they largely failed, bankrupting their nascent states which fell into the colonising hands of various Western powers. This also gave rise to a tradition of professional armies – a bane of the region ever since.

These rulers were often encouraged by Western Powers with an eye to the main chance. An attempt at the beginning of the 20th century to re-establish Ottoman rule through a Turkish-German alliance in the First Word War failed. The Arabs allied themselves with the British and French against the Ottomans, in the hope that this help would lead to independence. Instead, Britain and France merely divided the oil-rich region between themselves. And the British agreed to provide the Zionist movement with a homeland in Palestine.

The history – Western colonisation

So the region was carved up between various complicit allies of the (effectively) colonising powers. And in drawing up the borders, little attention was paid to ethnic and religious groupings.

Large-scale oil discoveries began in 1908 in Iran and in 1938 in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Their rulers became immensely rich. They used the wealth to consolidate their power, with the help of Western allies who used them as a bulwark against potentially less compliant regimes. This bred resentment which emerged in a variety of local conflicts, independence movements, and – eventually – the establishment of one of the most frightening terrorist movements that world has ever known.

Free money, corruption and envy

The gush of free money has generated greed, corruption and envy. The fact that the majority of terrorists who carried out the atrocities of 9/11 were Saudi citizens is not an accident. Saudi Arabia has most of the oil. Its rulers are the greediest in the region, and this greed had generated most of the envy and resentment. There have been crueller regimes in the Middle East but Saudi rulers do their best in this area too; their efforts to contain all opposition are ferocious.

Social failure

Throughout the Middle East, there is poverty, misery and discontent – and its autocratic rulers do little to improve the well-being of their populations. And this is as true of the oil-rich states as of the oil-poor countries. Hossein Askari in his book Middle East Oil Exporters – What happened to Economic Development? compared the social and economic performance of three groups of countries:

• MEOE: 6 Middle East oil exporters (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE)
• MEnOE: 5 Middle East non-oil-exporters (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia)
• CompC: 4 other countries in the process of development (Chile, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea) – these were included as a comparison and chosen because they started from a similar point on the development scale.

Using independent research, Askari demonstrates that:

• MEOE with small populations have achieved improvements in living standards (measured by mortality, reproductive health, inequality, health provision, education and welfare standards).
• However, MEOE with large populations – Iran and Iraq – have done no better than the MEnOE countries.
• No Middle Eastern country has performed nearly as well as the CompC.

To give an example. In 2002, infant mortality:

• In Iran and Saudi Arabia was about the same as in MEnOE.
• In Iraq, it was significantly worse than the average of the low income countries of the world.
• In Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, it is close to the average of the high-income countries of the world (although they did not do as well as the CompC).

Economic failure

MEOE have also failed to achieve success in economic growth. Despite huge inflows of cash from their oil exports, the money has not been re-invested to provide a continuing stable economic future for their populations as the oil is depleted.

The figures are a devastating indictment of policy and governance. Most MEOE achieved less than half the economic growth of the MEnOE, who themselves were unable to match the growth of CompC.

Unemployment

Unemployment rates in the region are very high, reflecting under-investment and poor development in non-oil activities. The spike in oil revenues following the price increases in 1973-4 generated a spike in population growth. This increase in population is now looking for jobs and, without economic growth, unemployment has soared to levels of 10% or more. This affects MEnOE just as much as the other countries, while and unemployment rates throughout the Middle East are significantly higher than in the CompC. The figures would be even worse if women were not discouraged from entering the labour force.

Where has the money gone?

So the big question is: where has the money gone? A very large part of it has been spent on defence. Defence is a euphemism for weapons and soldiers. Weapons and soldiers in the hands of the dictators and potentates of the Middle East are nothing more than boys' toys.

Boys' toys

A look at the numbers is startling. In 1999, Saudi Arabia spent over 50% of its oil revenue on military expenditure. For Iran, the figure was over 40%. And there have been years when almost all the countries spent more than 100% of oil revenues on defence.

The numbers of soldiers per head of population is high compared with the rest of the world.

But it is the huge sums spent on equipment that is truly staggering. Saudi Arabia is the largest spender of all. Over $21 bn per year is spent on the Saudi military (which translates into more than $112,000 per soldier per year).

Figures for 1999 are at the low end of the spending range, while Iraq has been constrained by sanctions. But with the huge accumulations of hardware, it is not surprising that the boys were unable to resist the temptation to take out their toys and play with them.

The cost of these games is devastating. In 1991, after its annexation by Iraq and the war that followed, Kuwait was left with a bill for reparations equivalent to half its oil revenue from 1975 to 2000 – a period of 25 years. This was just one of a succession of conflicts in the region, each of which carried a staggering cost in lives and money. And this is in addition to simmering civil disputes and the corrosive activities of terrorist factions.

Culture of corruption

Finally, the oil has supported a culture of corruption. In addition to many rulers regarding their states as their private property, officials and politicians take commissions to facilitate contracts of all kinds: building, oil investment and exports, the purchase of military hardware, services and so on.

Chickens come home to roost

The West is not an innocent party. First it set up a structure that was prone to conflict. Then it supported leaders, only to condemn them later when their agendas no longer fitted with Western strategies (notably Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden). It remains keen to balance its oil purchases with arms sales. And it is not averse to condoning corruption (e.g. BAE systems).

All this is happening at the highest level. Meanwhile at a lower level, children of the destitute and unemployed are being groomed in extremist madrasas and terrorist camps to fight the corrupt rulers who sully the Muslim faith. Their organisers are anxious for an opportunity to become the new rulers and to grab a slice of the cake. They are using young disillusioned Muslims throughout the world as pawns in their fight for power.

Oil has been a curse for the ordinary people of the Middle East, a curse which is infecting vulnerable Muslims around the world. And so when today's Western politicians complain that the West is an innocent party in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, they are, at the least, being disingenuous.

The information in the article is based on

And data from WMEAT (World military and arms transfers)

The interpretations are my own.

 

 

A really simple explanation of Sunni/Shia tension and the Middle East crisis – Part 4 Theological differences

Heresy is what the minority believe; it is the name given by the powerful to the doctrines of the weak. ~ Robert Green Ingersoll (1833 –1899)

Why do the Sunni and the Shia hate each other? And why has this hatred arisen today when, for many of the centuries since the schism, they rubbed along quite comfortably? It is just another example of the depressingly frequent tactic used by community leaders, to exploit differences between peoples for political advantage. They exaggerate these differences; foster a climate of mutual distrust; and before long, people set about abusing and killing each other.

The original split – election or dynasty

The split between Sunni and Shia goes back to the death of the Prophet Muhammed in 632 CE. It was about the succession. Some Muslims were democratic in their approach and thought the leader of Islam should be elected from among the learned and devout. They chose Abu Bakr, a close friend and companion of the Prophet, who became first Caliph, secular leader of the Islamic nation. His followers claimed the title of "Sunni," or followers of the tradition of the Prophet.

Other Muslims believed in a hereditary solution and chose to follow Ali, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law. They became known as Shia, or party of Ali, or people of the Prophet's household. Their leaders were known as Imams and they followed a line of succession appointed by Muhammed. This dynastic approach has some similarities with the Christian ideas of the divine right of kings and the apostolic succession in the Catholic and Anglican churches, and it continues to characterise Shia practice today. It is no longer dynastic but it does confer a sort-of infallibility on its leaders.

The schism is therefore between the Sunni belief that Islam confers no hereditary privilege or sainthood, and the Shia belief that its leaders are infallible, without sin, appointed by God.

Political rather than spiritual differences

From the beginning, the schism had a political rather than religious nature. The two sides supported their claims to legitimacy with selective readings of both the Koran and the Prophet's actions and sayings towards the end of his life. Ali, the Prophet's cousin, acknowledged his failure to win popular acclaim by accepting Abu Bakr's caliphate a few months after the Prophet's death. He later became the fourth Caliph (following the murder of the third Caliph by dissidents). The Prophet's wife opposed Ali's appointment as Caliph but she was defeated in battle. And although she was later reconciled with Ali, she had succeeded in establishing an opposition.

Ali was assassinated in 661 CE. His son Hussein led a doomed rebellion against the new Caliph and was killed on the battlefield at Karbala in 680 CE. It was his martyrdom which consolidated the separation of the Shia, and it is commemorated in a Shia festival and pilgrimage to Karbala (known as the Ashura). The celebration of the Ashura is a major difference in the rites followed by the two sects, and is a focus for the persecution of Shia by Sunni governments at times when the two sects are at odds with each other. And from time to time, it has provoked the same level of hostility and distrust as the Orange marches in Northern Ireland.

The dominance of the Sunni

In the past, the Shia had limited political success, in sharp contrast to the Sunni whose leaders spawned a succession of dynasties culminating in the Ottoman and Mughal empires. From the early days, the Sunni Caliphs viewed the Shia with suspicion and had to put down several revolts. The Shia claim to a higher truth through connection with the family of the Prophet was a threat to the Sunni; the best way to counter it was to brand Shia theology as heresy. So Sunni political success was accompanied by the development of schools of Islamic law and custom which grew up within a separate religious hierarchy.

Shia Imams and Ayatollahs

After Hussein's death at Karbala, the Shia leaders styled themselves as Imams. In the late 9th century, it was believed that the twelfth Imam had disappeared but not died. Some Shia sects still await his return (a Second Coming) and the idea remains a potent focus for Shia identity.

Eventually, the Shia changed to the Sunni system of using an Ulema (council) to select their supreme leader. The Ulema is made up of senior clerics with a high level of religious education. There is a sort-of parallel here with representative democracy in the West, where power is notionally vested in the people, but in practice it resides in elected representatives who operate independently in the name of the electorate. Membership of the Ulema is earned by religious knowledge and wisdom (rather than by election) but authority is exercised in the name of the Ummah, the community of Muslims. The Shia Ulema appoints a leader, known as an Ayatollah (Sign of Allah), a man who has great religious authority.

With the establishment of the Islamic republic in Iran, the Ulema became even more important among the Shia because it is now at the centre of Iranian government, the ultimate fusion of religion and state. But it is not monolithic. There is a waxing and waning of influence between various religious leaders which depends to a large extent on their ability to attract followers and funds. This is why it is not always clear who calls the shots in Iran.

In some Sunni countries, the Ulema exercise authority by acting as council to the King. And in both Sunni and Shia communities, the councils act as arbiters of Islamic (Sharia) law, in some countries, they also act as judges. This is why Muslims in Western countries find it easy to propose the notion that Sharia law could run parallel with civil law.

Madrasahs

Religious education is at the core of both spiritual leadership and ordinary life for Sunni and Shia. Madrasahs, the religious schools for ordinary Muslims, are growing in importance teaching the Koran to young children. Some madrasahs, however, have been established by fundamentalist groups to recruit and indoctrinate young people in an extreme interpretation of Islam. The first political success of this movement was achieved by Sunni madrasahs which fostered the Taliban.

Madrasahs are of particular importance in Pakistan where they fill a gap left by inadequate government funding. It is not known what proportion of these schools are in the hands of extremists.

Belief and practice

Distinctions between Sunni and Shia in terms of belief are few. They both adhere to the Five Pillars of Islam (the creed, prayer, charity, fasting and pilgrimage). The most visible difference is the Shia adherence to the Ashura. Other differences are concerned mainly with ritual. For example, Sunni pray five times a day while Shia (amalgamating some of the prayer times) pray three times a day. The two sects also use the prayer mat differently.

However, even these differences are fluid. Ayatollah Khomeini, a Shia fundamentalist, has discouraged the celebration of the Ashura in Iran and he surprised the Shia of Pakistan by his disdain for their traditions.

Current divisions and the impact of Ayatollah Khomeini

After the early disputes, Sunni belief and practice consolidated its dominance. The separate Shia hierarchy no longer posed a threat and the two sects rubbed along for many centuries, with little to distinguish their understanding of Islam.

Khomeini, in bringing fundamentalism back into Shia belief and practice, reopened the divide. He abandoned the outward differences by going back to the Koran, which should have made common cause with the fundamentalist practice of the Sunni. Instead, the racial and political differences between the two sects were exposed.

The Iranians are Persians, not Arabs, and their leadership of the Shia world is resented. So Arab Sunnis, however fundamentalist their ideas, would rather side with a dissolute Saudi royal family than with an Iranian Ayatollah, however pious he might be. Khomeini's establishment of an Islamic State was a cause for jealousy, not admiration.

Meanwhile the Shia of Iraq are, to a large extent, descended from Persians who moved to Iraq and adopted the Arabic language and identity in the 16th century. With renewed tension between Sunni and Shia, they are seen as the lackeys of Iran.

So Sunni and Shia rivalry is muddled up with Arab/non-Arab Muslim tension.

The threat to Sunni dominance

Politically, the dominance of the Sunni arose from their success in conquest during the early centuries of Islam. They were seen as the group which carried Islam into the world. The tables are now being turned.

The Shia have demonstrated an ability to humble Israel, a feat which eluded the Sunni. It was the Shia group Hezbollah, fighting from Lebanon with Iranian aid, which achieved this breakthrough. This too has generated jealousy amongst the Sunni and aggravated tension between the two sects. Sunni extremists are inspired to regain their status as champions of Islam by using their fashionable weapon: the suicide bomb.

What we are seeing in the Middle East is nothing new. We only have to think back to the torture and bloodshed which characterised the split between Catholics and the protestants in the 16th and 17th centuries. And the many other conflicts waged in the name of religious or racial or ideological differences.

www.parsarts.com/author/nmilaninia/

A really simple explanation of Sunni/Shia tension and the Middle East crisis – Part 3 The Oil

"War continues in Iraq. They're calling it Operation Iraqi Freedom. They were going to call it Operation Iraqi Liberation until they realized that spells 'OIL' "

Jay Leno (1950- )

With a handle on the demographics of Muslims in the Middle East, an understanding of the economy is the next place to go. It does not take much inspiration to start with oil.

There has been some controversy recently about whether the official figures on oil are honest and whether they have been calculated correctly. Some experts think there is something fishy about them. It's not easy to judge whether they are right or not, but a table of figures produced by Colin Campbell shows data which suggests some overstatement. Campbell is an oil expert who propagates the theory that the peak of oil production is either close or has passed, so we will soon face a shortage. His table shows that, when OPEC linked production quotas to declared reserves, some of its members mysteriously reported large increases in their reserves. Here are his figures:

Peak Oil (the theory that oil production has peaked) is a good example of a controversy where various ideas and figures are offered by opponents to support opposing points of view. A group of motivated consultants (who have worked in the oil industry but are now on its fringes) is pitted against another group representing the oil industry establishment. I am not an expert and have absolutely nothing to contribute to this debate. However, I am of the opinion (I emphasise the word opinion) that doom theories are very common and are rarely borne out by events. So, on balance, I don't believe (I emphasise the world believe) that the theory will prove correct.

This does not mean that Campbell's table, and his conclusion that certain countries are overegging the pudding, should be dismissed out of hand. The figures do look fishy and we must proceed with caution.

The procedure I follow in such circumstances is that I go with the official figures. There is nothing else that can seriously argue with them (though the table provides some clues about the magnitude of any errors), but I sound a note of caution about any conclusions drawn.

So let's see what we can find. A Google search yields an embarrassment of riches. Lots of sites offer information. The most comprehensive is provided by the Energy Information Administration (a US Government body which helpfully compares the results from three separate sources). Most of the figures are similar, so you can be reasonably sure that the people who look at these things are all singing from the same hymn sheet. Luckily, Infoplease seems to use the same base source and provides a much more user-friendly table which I have decided to go with.

And from this I have drawn up Chart 1, which shows immediately why the Middle East attracts so much attention. Many people I talk to are – obviously – aware that the Middle East is important for oil, but they are staggered by how overwhelmingly important it is. I certainly was.

Based on official figures, the Middle East is the repository of 56% of the world's oil (60% if we add North Africa). Even if we assume that Colin Campbell's estimates fully reflect the degree of overstatement and adjust the figures accordingly, the area still controls 48% of the world's oil reserves.

So the importance of the region is awesome and we can see why the US feels compelled to maintain a powerful political presence in the area.

Chart 1

Chart 2 shows how oil reserves are distributed throughout the Middle East:

• Saudi Arabia stands out as the largest repository, with twice as much oil as any other country.
• Kuwait and the UAE have a little less between them.
• Iran and Iraq are the next largest oil-producing countries and it is easy to understand why Saddam Hussein thought it worthwhile to try to capture the oil wealth of his neighbour Kuwait – and also why the US, with very willing allies, did not think twice about coming to Kuwait's aid.
• Afghanistan has no oil and geographically is distant from the real action. It is not surprising that the US was only a half-hearted about the invasion – Iraq was a much better prize.

Chart 2

Chart 3 is redrawn to exclude Campbell's suspect oil reserves. We can see how the picture changes in total magnitude but hardly changes at all in the relative importance of the countries.

Chart 3

So what conclusions can we draw? The reserves fall into three groups:

• The largest reserves are in Saudi Arabia, held by an administration that is generally friendly to the West and reliant for military support on the US. However, it has a restive population which it controls by repression. This restive group is well-funded and supports terrorist operations throughout the world (the Al Qaeda network). The administration's freedom to act is circumscribed by its deal with the fundamentalist Sunni Wahhabi sect (by definition an enemy of the West and its values) to which it has ceded to it a large measure of power. The country is also seen by many Muslims as the champion of the Sunni world (which includes 90% of Muslims, about a billion people). Saudi's rulers have to bend to the mood of this constituency which is tending to become more fearful, more fundamentalist and more anti-Western. So the largest oil reserves are under the control of an administration which looks distinctly vulnerable.
• Almost as large are the reserves of Kuwait and the UEA, countries with small populations which are entirely reliant for their defence on outside allies. The invasion of Kuwait showed that there is a willingness to accept the Americans and it is difficult to imagine that any alternative strategy is open to the ruling houses in these countries. It is also difficult to imagine that the US would let these states fall into the hands of hostile groups, although hostile fundamentalist organisations are no doubt working to exploit vulnerability in these countries.
• The third batch of reserves, again about the same size as those of Saudi Arabia, is shared between Iran and Iraq. And this is where Sunni and Shia come face to face. In Iraq, the Shia majority was kept down by a Sunni minority led by Saddam Hussein, who (in 1980) led the country into an eight-year war with the Shia in Iran to head off any possibility that they might foment internal resistance. The war cost a million lives and was characterised by waves of Iranian suicide infantry clearing minefields by blowing themselves up, and by gas attacks by the Iraqis. You can imagine the ill-feeling between Sunni and Shia that this left behind, and both sides took the opportunity offered by the invasion of Iraq to stir up as much hatred and mistrust as they could. There are daily atrocities. Groups of people and buildings are targeted, as well as the abduction, torture and murder of individuals.

The coalition walked calmly into this hornet's nest and was surprised when it was stung. It's arrival has hardened attitudes throughout the region.

This is not an exceptional conclusion. But what I have done is to assemble evidence which means that we can now defend this point of view, while it is harder for opponents to challenge it. It also makes the argument between the pro- and anti- war groups much clearer. Instead of all the nonsense about weapons of mass destruction, regime change, the freeing of a subjugated population, and the introduction of democracy, we have a question to ask. Do we want to risk half the world's oil falling into the hands of a hostile group of fundamentalists who are openly hostile to the West and its values?

If we ask this question, the issue becomes very clear and, in one sense, easier to argue. On the other hand, questions of morality and international law are thrown into sharp and unflattering focus.

So a big decision was made on our behalf and an enormous risk was taken. It will be a tragedy – for which we shall all have to pay – if it turns out that the risk was taken by a man who was not up to the task and who bodged this difficult and dangerous venture.

Sources:

Peak Oil

Infoplease

EIA

A really simple explanation of Sunni/Shia tension and the Middle East crisis – Part 2 The People

Human diversity makes tolerance more than a virtue; it makes it a requirement for survival. ~ René Jules Dubos (1901 – 1982)

I have divided this article into two parts. The first is an analysis of the Sunni/Shia divisions of the Middle East population; the second shows my methods for researching the numbers and marshalling the data. Because there is so much to go through, the first part is longer than normal. I hope you will stick with it. I understand a lot more about the situation in the Middle East than I did when I started my research and I hope that you will too.

I have put material about my methods of research onto a separate page which you can access at the end of this article.

A little background

Islam was founded in the 7th century on the Arabian Peninsula in the heart of the Middle East. Within a hundred years, it had spread north to the borders of what is now Turkey; east to Afghanistan and the borders of what is now Pakistan; and west along the southern shore of the Mediterranean, all the way to the Atlantic and across into Spain (and with the exception of Spain, it has dominated these areas ever since). More recently, it has expanded further to the east and the south.

The split between Sunni and Shia occurred soon after the death of Mohammed and, almost from the start, the Shia were regarded as heretics – even as non-believers – and discriminated against in many periods of Islamic history (I shall return to the differences between the two sects at a later date). Distrust between the two sects has waxed and waned over the centuries, a deep-rooted, historic animosity that is being revived in today's conflict.

An overview of the region

The area covered in this study is focused on the heartland that was established in the 7th and 8th centuries. Map 1 shows the countries examined (Western Sahara and Mauritania are excluded from the study).

The map shows how close the Middle East is to the EU on the west and to Russia on the north, while a batch of former Soviet states with their own Muslim populations are found to the north-east.

Map 1

• In order to focus my analysis, I divided the area into three sub-sections:
• the central Middle East (CME), where most of the oil is found and where the current conflict is centered.
• the outer Middle East (OME), a circle of populous countries with little in the way of oil, which surround the central area.
• North African countries (NA), which have significant oil reserves. This area is important because Algeria is where Islamic terrorism began. It is home to very few Shia Muslims and will therefore not be considered in detail until later articles when I will look at oil.

Map 2 shows the central area of the Middle East (CMO) in more detail.

Map 2

Where Sunni and Shia live

Chart 1 analyses the population of the three sub-sectors and throws up some interesting features. The whole region is home to 635mn Muslims, a little more than half the world's Islamic population (estimated at between 900 mn and 1.4 bn):

• 13% live in North Africa (NA) and are almost entirely Sunni.
• 52% live in the outer Middle East (OME) and are also mostly Sunni, although a significant number of Shia live in Pakistan.
• The other 35% live in the central Middle East (CME) and 44% of them are Shia.

Chart 1

Chart 2 breaks down the huge population of the OME. This is dominated by Pakistan, although Egypt, Turkey and Sudan have populations to rival that of Iran, the largest country in the CME.

Chart 2

I started my research with the idea that the CME was fairly evenly divided between Sunni and Shia. But Chart 3 shows a dramatically different picture. First, Iran and Iraq are the only countries with a significant Shia majority, and together they account for 77% of the population of the area. Second, the Shia are overwhelmingly concentrated in Iran. And as Iraq also has a Shia majority, we can begin to understand what is driving the conflict.

Examining the chart further, we see that Afghanistan and Yemen are the only other large-population countries where the Shia minority is of a significant size. Shia also outnumber Sunni in Bahrain and Lebanon, but these countries have small populations.

Chart 3

So let's recap with another map, helpfully provided on the internet by the US Congressional Research Service.

Map 3

Now we can begin to build a picture which allows us to understand a little more about the various conflicts.

The Shia heartland and the focus of the conflict

The first thing that stands out is that the Middle East is not evenly divided between Sunni and Shia. Since Iran has by far the largest Shia population, you might expect it to have common cause with Iraq, the only other large-population country with a Shia majority. And yet these two countries fought the bitter Iran-Iraq war through the 1980s. Three things divided them:

• the Sunni minority led by Saddam Hussein was in charge in Iraq and, over the years, the Shia population was pushed further and further from power.
• Iranians, unlike Iraqis, are mainly Persians (not Arabs).
• Iraq was run as a secular state, whereas Iran (following the overthrow of the Shah in 1978/9 by the fiercely fundamentalist Ayatollah Khomeini) became an Islamic Republic.

A step back: the rise of Sunni fundamentalism and Al Qaeda

In order to understand the significance of the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini, we need to look at the power structures in the region.

Islam claims a very special place in the lives of its followers. It provides them, not only with a spiritual structure to guide them, but laws by which they should organise their personal, family and community lives. This poses a problem for political rulers and their relations with religious hierarchies. For a long period, and in most of the countries, rulers tried to run secular states alongside an Islamic legal structure. They made links with the West and did not force strict Islamic rules on their populations. Women, for example, were educated and allowed to pursue professional careers in most countries. More than one Islamic country has been led by a woman.

The special place of Saudi Arabia and the House of Saud

Saudi Arabia was the exception. It was the dominant state of the region for two reasons:

• It had the bulk of the oil and was therefore very wealthy.
• It was – literally – the cradle of Islam.

The Saudi royal house (the House of Saud) was the guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. In order to fulfil its spiritual role while allowing its royalty to enjoy the massive wealth from oil resources, a special relationship was established between the House of Saud and the fundamentalist Wahhabi (Sunni) sect. The Wahhabi hierarchy was given control over religious law, while the royal family controlled secular matters, notably economic and diplomatic affairs. Crucially, the House of Saud looked to the West to provide it with resources to secure its political control of the country. And this control is absolute; the House of Saud views its kingdom as a family asset.

Along with other oil-rich countries, Saudi's efforts to improve the quality of life for the mass of its population were limited. And the little it did do was counter-productive. It provided education without opportunity. As a result, a resentful class of poor – and not so poor – second-class citizens emerged, which turned to fundamental Islam for an outlet for their frustration.

It was among this group of disgruntled Sunnis in Saudi Arabia that the seeds of Al Qaeda began to grow. Their anger was against the House of Saud and its Western allies. The rhetoric they used was religious and it attracted followers throughout the region, resentful at the way in which oil revenues lined the pockets of lax Muslim rulers and their infidel Western supporters. Some of these malcontents – notably Osama bin Laden – also had money which they used to fund the dissident movements in the region and beyond.

The Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war

Although Saudi Arabia enforced adherence to Muslim law, there was no integration between religion and state. It was Ayatollah Khomeini and his Iranian Revolution which first established a fiercely-fundamentalist Islamic state. But it was a Shia state and it posed a threat to the Sunnis. While Khomeini did little to disguise his contempt for the laxity of the Saudi royal family, his biggest threat was to Saddam's Hussein's Ba'ath regime in Iraq.

Saddam was Sunni, his rule was distinctly secular, and the persecution of his Shia majority made it easy for Khomeini to attract followers with his fundamentalist call. Saddam recognised the danger. Fearing that the newly-fundamentalist Iran would encourage his Shia majority to rebel against him, he made a peremptory strike before Khomeini had time to consolidate his forces. And so began the eight-year Iran-Iraq war which resulted in the deaths of a million people.

The war ended in stalemate in 1988, despite Iraq's military advantage and use of chemical weapons, and Saddam took his revenge on his Shia population.

Sunni/Shia tensions in Iraq after Saddam

With the overthrow of Saddam, it is not surprising that Iraq's Sunni minority are feeling vulnerable. De-Ba'athification (the elimination of Saddam's political Ba'ath party) has meant that the Shia majority – which suffered discrimination for so long – is now on the cusp of gaining the upper hand. It is also in search of revenge.

It is Shia men who are joining the police and security forces; it is Shia men who are accused of abusing their position against their former tormentors. And this is why Sunni suicide bombers so often attack the queues waiting to join the security services.

The security vacuum created by the invasion of Iraq – and exacerbated by de-Ba'athification and the dismantling of the Iraqi army and police – has created an opportunity for Al Qaeda, the terrorist arm of Sunni fundamentalism. And it is Al Quaeda which is taking advantage of Sunni vulnerability in Iraq to insinuate itself into the vacuum left by the invasion.

The Sunni Shia battle lines

Khomeini hoped that his fundamentalist call would mobilise opponents of the House of Saud to help eliminate Western influence in the region. Instead, he recharged ancient antagonisms between Persians and Arabs and precipitated a contest between fundamentalist Sunni and Shia for the soul of Islam. And once again, Sunni mullahs began to denounce Shia as heretics, as not truly Muslim.

King Faisal, who ruled Saudi Arabia from 1964 to 1975, was a devout man who lived humbly (it was his memory that gave credibility, despite their ostentatious lifestyles, to his three younger brothers who succeeded him). In addition to allowing the royal family to live the high life, Saudi Arabia used its wealth to support Sunni religious projects elsewhere in the region. So Khomeini's attack on the profligacy of the House of Saud was not well received. It caused further tension between Sunni and Shia, and Saudi police attacked Shia pilgrims on the Hajj. In one incident in 1987, 402 people were killed.

Disintegration

With this background, it is not surprising that Iraq is riven with factions. There are moderate Shia and fundamentalist Shia, moderate Sunni and fundamentalist Sunni. And as ever in a power vacuum, strong men and religious leaders within each group jockey for position. The consequence is bitter infighting and a horrific campaign of sectarian violence: kidnapping, torture and murder. There is also friction within the sects and this too can break out into violence.

Another - political – split within Shia ranks is between those who want to use their majority to dominate any new administration and those who prefer a federal solution (by which Shia would have ascendency in some regions, leaving Sunni majorities in other areas to run their own affairs). As a result, Iraqis working with the US occupiers are finding it difficult to mobilise support for a unitary government to include the Sunni minority. The situation has become even more difficult since the bombing of the mosque in Samarra, a major Shia shrine, in February 2006. This blatant attack by Sunnis on an important Shia symbol was inflammatory and the death toll from sectarian violence rose from 500 to 900 deaths per month in the aftermath.

The dilemma of the US

The US in Iraq is caught between a rock and a hard place. The de-Ba'athification policy instituted when the Americans arrived in Baghdad, and the democracy which they are now attempting to establish, mean that the Shia are in the ascendant. The displaced Sunni establishment is resentful and hostile. But any attempt by the US to redress the balance revives Shia memories of the first Gulf War when they were encouraged by the US to rebel against Saddam and then abandoned to the cruelty of his revenge. Above all, it stiffens the resolve of Iran to support its co-religionists and to make bellicose threats.

Effects on the region

The intractable problem inside Iraq is now echoed across the region. Iran, as leader of the Shia, is mobilising wherever it can. It is focusing on Lebanon, which has a small population but a relatively high proportion of Shia and is situated on the western edge of the Middle East adjacent to Israel, with the ability to strike at this arch enemy of all Muslims.

Iran is therefore funding Hezbollah, the Shia militia group, to engage in hostilities with Israel. It is also channelling money through Hezbollah to help Lebanese families handle the aftermath of Israeli attacks. In this way, it is funding a friendly party to establish a political power base in Lebanon.

Above all, it is the success of Hezbollah against Israel that is giving the Shia the upper hand in the region – in stark contrast to repeated Sunni failure. Shia success gives Iran and its allies an advantage which even the most formidable of Shia enemies, the Saudi regime, cannot match.

And finally there is Lebanon's neighbour, Syria, where a secular Shia minority governs a majority Sunni population. Its government's natural allies are Iran and Hezbollah – and with this rather weak link, the Shia have a continuous chain of control across the north of the region.

Polarisation

The governments of the oil-rich Sunni states, especially Saudi Arabia, are walking a tightrope. They rely on the West, especially the US, to provide them with military support and financial infrastructure. This is a dangerous policy in a climate where fundamentalist mullahs are capturing the hearts of a deeply-frustrated younger generation. These young men have limited prospects and little chance to sample the pleasures of the West (which are so ostentatiously enjoyed by the elites in their countries). Through fundamentalist education and inclusion in fanatical groups, they are finding an alternative outlet for their aspirations.

The easiest way for Sunni governments to deflect attention away from their unpopular and dangerous allegiance with "the Devil" – the West – is to emphasise hostility to Iran and to the Shia heresy. At the same time, Shia ascendancy in the north of the region may well encourage Sunni governments to act against their Shia minorities. So there is danger of a growing polarisation between the two sects.

                                      A brief recap

So we now have an outline of the background against which the conflict is taking place. Understanding where the Shia population is concentrated helps to explain why there is tension inside Iraq and why Iran is trying to win the allegiance of its fellow Shia by providing them with military support. It also explains why Al Qaeda finds adherents. As the most active Sunni force, it offers a strong arm to support the Sunni minority in Iraq which is now in such a vulnerable position.

Neither governments nor religious establishments are monolithic. Beneath the surface there is a lot of jostling for position, particularly inside Iran. The extremists are in the minority, but growing fear and sectarian tension leads to polarisation and drives the moderates into the camp of extremists on both sides of the sectarian divide. The US has no natural and unequivocal allies, so is particularly vulnerable to this shifting situation. Its much-vaunted reliance on democracy will backfire as the Middle East turns increasingly to hard-line attitudes. All this and much, much more awaits us as we continue our investigation.

Next week, we shall look at oil.

Sources

CIA World Factbook

MideastWeb Gateway

Congressional Research Service

Notes on research methods

For an explanation of the colour coding see note at the end of the first artcle in this series

A really simple explanation of Sunni/Shia tension and the Middle East crisis - an illustrated guide to researching the internet

"If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called research, would it?" ~ Albert Einstein (1879 –1955)

 

Like most people, I am worried about what is going on in the Middle East and the way it appears to be developing into a major rift between Muslims and the rest of the world. I know very little about Islam and have only a caricatured image of the Middle East in my mind. I would guess that many others find themselves in a similar state of ignorance.

So I have set myself the difficult task of boiling it down into an explanation that is easy to follow. But that is what I like best: to take a big question and break it down into bits, so I can understand what is going on and draw my own conclusions. Before I retired, I did this for a living and what an exciting and inspiring activity it was. Now that I have been writing this blog for almost three months, it occurred to me that I could use my old skills in a new arena.

When I started to tackle the Middle East, I soon realised it was far too big a problem to condense into one 1500 word essay (the length of most articles posted on this blog). My first idea was to just break the topic down into bits. But then it occurred to me that, with all the talk about amateurism on the internet, readers might find it interesting to learn how the internet can be used to find information to develop and present an argument. The process is this:

• Find the information
• Assess its quality
• Pull it together
• And present it

I am a fervent believer in the democratising effect of the internet in all its manifestations. But using any tool properly needs training. I am not talking about the technology of the internet,but the information it contains. Not the box, but what is inside it.

When I was working as a researcher and analyst, the internet did not exist and my research took me to libraries across the world, both public and private. I was relatively well resourced and could interview people and go and see things on the ground which helped me to build an even better picture. With the internet, there is a lot more information about, and it is quicker and easier to find, but sifting the good from the bad is more difficult. So over the next few weeks, I shall share with journey through cyberspace with you using my research into the Middle East as an example.

 

When I was working, questions were posed by my clients who paid good money for the answers. Now I have the luxury of asking my own questions. So why the Middle East and why Sunni and Shia Muslims?

At one level, the answer is obvious. 9/11 meant that the free world – which is the only world in which I care to live – was threatened. That threat came from the Middle East and was committed by fundamentalist Muslims about whom I knew little or nothing. I knew that the Middle East is an area of constant strife and ferment, and that it is the repository of much of the world's oil. But I knew little about what it was actually like, about the people who lived there, or how the oil was shared between the various nations.

I was inspired to dig deeper by Vali Nasr's book The Shia Revival, which provides an illuminating introduction to the religious and cultural tensions in the region. It focuses on the religious aspect of the problem and much of the first part of the book is a review of the history and theology (to which I shall return later). The key thing I learned from the early pages is that, across the world, Sunnis represent 85-90% of Muslims but, in the Middle East, the numbers are more evenly divided. I also read Matthew Carr's book The Infernal Machine, which traces the history of the current bout of Muslim terrorism back to 1948.

So I had a historical and cultural structure on which I could build. But I felt sufficiently confident to believe that my own research skills could illuminate what I had read and add a little more to my understanding.

Had I not read these books, I would have started my research by looking in Wikipedia and Encyclopaedia Britannica (the latter can be accessed on line for a modest annual fee.) Encarta is an alternative to Britannica which I do not often use. Wikipedia comes in for a lot of flack because it is put together by "amateurs". However, many of these amateurs are also experts in their own fields who give their time and expertise for free.

Wikipedia's open nature also attracts partisans with their own axes to grind, but they are watched by their opponents who can quickly redress the balance. Wikipedia has the advantage that it is being continually updated and corrected. This is not true for many conventionally-published reference books (including those available online). My wife, a historian, is continually frustrated by inaccuracies in the online National Dictionary of Biography; her efforts to get simple mistakes corrected are met with a wall of silence. Conventional publishers may do their best to check for mistakes but are constrained by time and money issues.

We have to be realistic about information. It is only as good as its original collectors made it. It never gives 20/20 vision. But an opinion backed by the best information available is always better than a guess or a knee-jerk reaction. What we have to guard against is information that is systematically biased. This is not true of Wikipedia or Britannica, but they are different. I like to think of it this way: w-b=z (where w=wiki, b = Britannica and z = the zeitgeist).

What is the point of all this background research? It is simply this: an exam question along the lines of "The Middle East – discuss" would be very hard to tackle, whereas the question "Does the schism between Shi'ites and Sunnis contribute to the problems of the Middle East?" provides a structure to help think about the problem and investigate it properly. Knowing the right question to ask can contribute 50% or more to finding a satisfactory answer. The choice of approach often comes from inspiration after an initial probing. In my case, Vali Nasr's book convinced me that an understanding of the Middle East problem was likely to be found by focusing my research on the relationship between Sunni and Shia. Beneath the headlines which focus on terrorist attacks on the West, and the intervention of the Western coalition in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is a continuing rumble of Muslim-on-Muslim violence, with a much bigger and more relentless death toll.

Whenever I start to research a subject, I try to get a handle on numbers. Numbers tell you so much; without them, you are floundering. You have no idea of the size of what you are looking at, and you don't know how the different parts relate each other. Numbers give you a sense of scale, and they sometimes provide spectacular insights. This proved true in this investigation.

A couple of housekeeping notes. I am not writing a textbook or a manual. I am offering you the chance to "sit by Nellie". (In the dim and distant past, there was no formal training in my business. You were assigned as a new boy or girl to work with someone who had the skills. Hence – "sit by Nellie and watch what she does". It worked for me.)

In these articles I shall do my best to separate guidance on methodology from the results of research.

First, I plan to mark passages which have a lot of methodological information by presenting them in blue boxes – like this one. The boxes may also include real content. Remember that Nellie has a job to do and can't spend all her time worrying about whoever is sitting beside her.

Second, I will sometimes come across ideas and leads that I cannot deal with immediately, so I shall highlight them to remind me to go back to them. I shan't follow them all up, but that doesn't mean that you shouldn't – if they interest you. Research is about following your own nose.

Finally, sources are marked to remind me where I found stuff and at the bottom of each article there will be a list of links.

I hope you find this journey interesting.

 

Links referred to in the article:

talk about the amateurism on the internet

Wikipedia

Encyclopaedia Britannica

Encarta

Matthew Carr's book The Infernal Machine

Vali Nasr's book The Shia Revival